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Abstract—In the past years, great effort has been spent on
enhancing the security and safety of vehicular systems. Current
advances in information and communication technology have
increased the complexity of these systems and lead to ex-
tended functionalities towards self-driving and more connectivity.
Unfortunately, these advances open the door for diverse and
newly emerging attacks that hamper the security and, thus,
the safety of vehicular systems. In this paper, we contribute to
supporting the design of resilient automotive systems. We review
and analyze scientific literature on resilience techniques, fault
tolerance, and dependability. As a result, we present the REMIND
resilience framework providing techniques for attack detection,
mitigation, recovery, and resilience endurance. Moreover, we
provide guidelines on how the REMIND framework can be used
against common security threats and attacks and further discuss
the trade-offs when applying these guidelines.
Index Terms—cyber-physical systems, resilience techniques,
security, vehicular systems, automotive systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past years great effort has been spent in publishing
guidelines and standards for security frameworks specific to
their domains and in identifying security principles. Examples
range from the NIST guideline for cybersecurity in smart
grids [1], the cybersecurity guideline for ships [2], cyberse-
curity guidelines for the automotive domain [3]–[5] and the
upcoming ISO/SAE standard for cybersecurity engineering for
road vehicles, namely ISO 21434 [6].
Resilience is the next step towards reliable, dependable and
secure vehicular systems. Vehicles need to be able to mitigate
faults, errors, attacks and intrusions that would ultimately re-
sult in failures in order to withstand safety and security threats
from their environment. We define automotive resilience as the
“property of a system with the ability to maintain its intended
operation in a dependable and secure way, possibly with
degraded functionality, in the presence of faults and attacks.”
This definition is inspired by Laprie’s definition [7] and the
definition of network resilience by Sterbenz et al. [8]; however,
the chosen definition highlights that faults or changes, e.g.,
functional and environmental (see [7]), can also be originated
by an attacker whose aim is to disrupt the system.
Resilience can be obtained in many different ways and
on different levels, i. e., hardware, software or (sub)-system
level. Today’s internal architecture of vehicles is quite complex
and can be distributed over more than hundred so-called
Electronic Control Units (ECUs). However, we are currently
in a transition towards a more centralized architecture where
functions will be concentrated on much fewer and more pow-
erful ECUs [9]. These central ECUs are connected to sensors,
actuators, external communication media and to some extent
to smaller legacy subsystems. Such a centralized architecture
enables vehicle OEMs not only to perform more resource
intensive operations needed for autonomous driving, but also
allows to introduce new designs and technologies needed to
secure and protect these highly connected and autonomous
vehicles. Virtualization is seen as one key technology enabling
the isolation of vehicle functions from each other along
with the possibility to dynamically assign hardware resources.
Introducing resilience to such a centralized automotive system
requires the deployment of techniques and principles in all
layers and components of the system, ranging from the vehicle
itself, the connected IT infrastructure, road infrastructure and
the communication to other vehicles.
Motivation. The increasing complexity towards au-
tonomous driving combined with the interconnectedness of
vehicles, e. g., vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure
communication, and the continuous development of functions
require vehicles to react and adapt to changes and attacks
independently. The automotive domain is distinct from other
domains as it is a safety and real-time critical system operated
by millions of individuals each day. Furthermore, security and
safety techniques need to be aligned and extended with re-
silience techniques in order to strengthen vehicles’ capabilities
to withstand impending threats.
Contributions. This paper provides a framework to design
resilient automotive systems. First, we systematically identify
relevant automotive resilience techniques proposed in the
literature with the goal to provide a full picture of available
tools and techniques. We also organize these techniques into
a taxonomy, which comprises the categories of Detection,
Mitigation, Recovery, and Endurance (REMIND). These cat-
egories represent high-level strategies that can help designers
understand the purpose of each technique. Further, it can be
beneficial to combine techniques from different strategies to
achieve multiple layers of security. The selection of the right
technique for the task at hand is further supported by asso-
ciating the resilience techniques to the classes of automotive
assets they are appropriate for. Additionally, we elaborate on
the trade-offs (i.e., pros and cons) that are associated with
each of the techniques, e.g., with respect to performance and
other qualities. In summary, we provide a multi-dimensional
decision support framework (built in a bottom-up fashion from
the analysis of the literature) that can lead designers to the
informed and optimal selection of a suitable set of resilience
techniques to be implemented in an automotive system.
TABLE I
PUBLICATIONS THAT PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OR COLLECTION OF
RELEVANT TECHNIQUES.
Discipline Existing Work Domain
Resilience
Chang2015 [10] Fog Computing
Hukerikar2017 [11] High Performance Computing
NIST 800-160v2 [12] Systems Engineering
Ratasich2019 [13] Cyber-Physical Systems
Sterbenz2010 [8], [14] Networks
Security Segovia2019 [15] SCADA systems
Dependability Bakhshi2019 [16] Fog Computing
Fault Tolerance
Egwutuoha2013 [17] High Performance Computing
Kumari2018 [18] Cloud Computing
Mukwevho2018 [19] Cloud Computing
Slåtten2013 [20] Software Engineering
Wanner2012 [21] Vehicle Controller
II. METHODOLOGY
By means of a systematic literature survey, we identify
research papers that discuss techniques that are suitable to
provide automotive resilience. We consider existing work
related to resilience, fault tolerance and dependability. We also
analyze the papers describing each technique to understand (i)
the assets that can benefit from the technique, (ii) the risks that
are mentioned as being mitigated by the techniques, and (iii)
any pros/cons associated with the use of such technique.
We identified relevant research papers by searching the
Scopus database1. A search string was intended to find relevant
publications that carried out a review of suitable techniques.
Therefore, we formulated the search string to include survey
or literature review, and relevant topics, such as resilience,
survivability, attack recovery, error handling or fault tolerance,
as well as the keywords software, system or network. We
excluded the keywords FPGA, memory, wireless, SDN and
hardware to limit the search result to publications focusing
on system architecture, software design or physical networks.
Furthermore, we considered only publications written in En-
glish and published after 2010 in the areas of computer science
and engineering. We manually screened the 200 most relevant
publications returned by Scopus and found eight additional
research publications, which were added to our result set.
Ultimately, we retained and analyzed 12 publications which
are shown in Table I.
III. ATTACK MODEL AND ASSETS
The four strategies in the REMIND framework are, as
shown in Figure 1, further refined in patterns and techniques.
A collection of these techniques specific for automotive sys-
tems is described in Section IV and has been identified based
on existing research in other domains and areas (see Table I).
We additionally describe the trade-offs of these techniques in
Appendix A and point to relevant publications in Appendix B.
In the remainder of this section we describe the assets, security
threats and attacks of automotive systems.
We consider four asset types, namely Hardware, Software,
Network/Communication and Data Storage. The attacker aims
1https://www.scopus.com/
to compromise these assets via various attack vectors, whereas
the defender, i.e. the vehicle, aims to cope with these attacks
via resilience techniques. We consider skilled attackers as
well as novice hackers (e. g., script kiddies) and further give
examples from an asset, threat and attacker perspective.
Hardware. Can be broken down to ECUs, Sensors and
Actuators. An ECU can vary in complexity depending on its
objective, from a specific limited task to a multitude of tasks.
The former can relate to the processing of a sensor signal
and the latter an infotainment-system with lots of applications.
Sensors can give information about speed, temperature and
obstacle distance and identification where the Actuators turn
input from these sensors (via an ECU) into actions, such as
braking, steering and engine control.
Attack example. Tampering with existing hardware or in-
stalling malicious hardware into the vehicle can act as me-
diators to gain complete vehicle control. Input signals from
sensors may be manipulated to cause an unwanted behavior.
Software. Can be in transit, at rest or running. In transit can
relate to software provisioning systems, such as over-the-air
or workshop updates and the latter two to software installed
or running in ECUs.
Attack example. Software vulnerabilities might be exploited,
e. g., via a privilege escalation attack which enables ECUs
to be re-programmed with additional functionalities, such as
adding remote access to the system.
Network/Communication. Can be broken down to internal
and external communication. Examples for internal commu-
nication are CAN, FlexRay, LIN, MOST and Automotive
Ethernet and for external communication Wi-Fi, Bluetooth,
and V2X as well as external interfaces such as OBD-II, debug
ports (e. g., JTAG) and CD player.
Attack example. The attacker can try to inject malicious data,
through a device connected to an in-vehicle bus affecting the
internal communication. Furthermore, modification of V2X
data from other vehicles as well as malicious roadside units
(e. g., vehicle positioning or traffic condition data) could affect
system functions.
Data Storage. Can potentially be sensitive data, such as
cryptographic keys, forensics logs, system information (e. g.,
from software libraries, OS and applications) and reports about
the vehicle and the driver.
Attack example. The attacker can exploit secret keys used for
sensitive diagnostics to disable firewalls. Logs and report data
might be manipulated or removed to hide forensic evidence
of the crime. Furthermore, information about the system can
reveal vulnerabilities which might be exploited.
Attackers typically exploit the above-mentioned assets in
any order to achieve their goal, e. g., uploading malicious soft-
ware to the vehicle by first compromising the cryptographic
keys to get access to the memory and consequently upload a
modified firmware containing malicious code. This can give
elevated privileges and extended functionality which could
cause inconsistencies or disruption of the system.
More examples of assets and related security threats and
attacks can be found in Table II.
TABLE II
AUTOMOTIVE ASSETS AND RELATED SECURITY THREATS AND ATTACKS








Fault Injection: fuzzing, DoS, microprobing, malicious hardware as well as
environmental injections (e. g., voltage and temperature) can disrupt or disable
components or system resources.
Information Leakage: side channel parameters, such as timing information or power










Malware/Manipulated software: indirectly affecting storage through alteration, dele-
tion or blocking data, or indirect affecting the communication by read, manipulate


















Fabrication/Jamming attack: introducing fake traffic, e. g., sending high priority
messages, to block legitimate low priority messages.
Masquerading/Spoofing attack: masquerading as a legitimate node, e. g., by sus-
pending the authentic ECU and send fabricated messages which seems to origin
from the same.
Collision: spoofing a message to induce a bit error/collision and then potentially
spoof additional messages which get accepted.
Eavesdropping/hijacking: intercept to read, block, manipulate or replay messages.
Suspension/DoS attack: disable an ECU, such as inducing programming mode













Unauthorized read: acquire sensitive data, such as privacy related user data e. g.,
previous locations or driving behavior.
Manipulation: malicious alteration of data, e. g., replacing the software validation
key enables potential alteration of memory data.
Removal: data deletion of sensitive information, such as forensics data.
Reverse engineering: extraction and analysis of firmware to deduce design features,
vulnerabilities or secret keys.
IV. REMIND AUTOMOTIVE RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK
We have developed the REMIND framework shown in
Figure 1 to provide system designers and developers with a
categorization of suitable resilience mechanisms including the
identification of the assets they protect. The structure of the
layers is chosen similarly to the work in Hukerikar et al. [11],
where the bottom layer is divided into strategies and the mid
layer is split into patterns that provide more details about
the way the strategies can be realized. We refer to relevant
solutions for automotive systems in the top layer and further
link to the survey papers and reviews that identify specific
techniques for their domain in the description listed below.
The four REMIND strategies for providing resilience for
vehicular systems are:
• Detection. Faults, attacks and other anomalies need to be
detected by the system in order to take reactive measures
to avoid a failure.
• Mitigation. Once an anomaly is detected and located,
mitigation techniques need to be triggered to keep the
system operational. These techniques may result in a non-
optimal system state.
• Recovery. Transitioning back to the desired, i. e., opti-
mum state, is the aim of recovery.
• Endurance. The focus is set on lasting resilience in
contrast to recovery & mitigation strategies which aim
at taking immediate measures.
The remaining part of this section details the strategies and
describes the patterns and corresponding techniques.
A. Detection
The monitoring and detection capabilities of a system can be
limited due to various factors, such as computational resources,
energy consumption, and the complexity of functions and
network architecture. The move to a more centralized architec-
ture, however, paves the way for more extensive monitoring.
1) SPECIFICATION-BASED DETECTION: Malicious or
abnormal behavior is detected using a specification that de-
scribes the behavior of signals or communication patterns.
Domain knowledge is needed to create the specifications.
– Signature-based Detection [13]. Signatures are constructed
to describe known attack behavior. By design, these techniques
suffer from detecting new attacks and zero-day vulnerabilities.
However, they typically achieve a low false positive rate [24].
– Runtime Verification [13], [20]. A monitor observes the
system at runtime to verify the correctness of the execu-
tion. Formal specification languages, e. g., Signal Temporal
Logic [58], have been developed to describe the normal system
behavior which is matched against a trace during execution.
– Falsification-based Analysis [13]. It extends STL by includ-
ing a quantitative semantics allowing the return of real values
rather than Boolean values.
– Verification of Safety-Properties [13]. The formal verifica-
tion of safety properties has become increasingly complex
due to the added functionality in modern vehicles. Exhaustive
verification techniques, as listed and argued by Ratasich et
al. [13], are currently limited to small scale models.
– Specification-based Anomaly Detection. Normal behavior,
according to a set of rules, is defined using this technique. An


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 1. REMIND resilience techniques and solutions including a mapping to the assets for each technique. The overlap of the Mitigation strategy highlights
that some patterns also contribute to Detection respectively Recovery.
2) ANOMALY-BASED DETECTION: Anomaly- or behav-
ior-based detection techniques are based on comparing behav-
ior with a model of normal behavior. Alerts are raised when
a deviation is detected [59].
– Statistical Techniques [13]. A statistical model describing
the system or a specific process is designed in order to
detect anomalies. Events are considered anomalies when the
probability of their occurrence is below a certain threshold
according to the model.
– Machine Learning/Data Mining [13]. These techniques
typically do not require domain knowledge. A model, such
as Bayesian networks, neural networks and support vector
machines, learns through training data how to classify obser-
vations in normal and abnormal classes.
– Information-theoretic Detection [13]. The entropy of infor-
mation can be used to detect anomalies, as a change of the
entropy above a certain threshold may be caused by an attack,
e. g., masquerading attack [13], [27].
– Localization. Finding the source of the attack may be
required to take appropriate actions. Network-based Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs) can be used to limit the location to
a specific subnet, however, solutions identifying the particular
ECU are needed (e. g., [28]).
3) PREDICTION OF FAULTS AND ATTACKS: First, the
system needs to identify the presence of an attacker. The next
actions are attack projection and attack intention recognition
which aim at identifying the next steps and the ultimate goal
of the attacker. Attack or intrusion prediction can be used to
foresee when and where an attack will take place [29].
Adversaries mounting simpler attacks on a single vehicle,
such as DoS attacks on the CAN bus, may be difficult to
predict as the attack consists of fewer steps. However, large-
scale attacks requiring the attacker to go through several stages
may be predicted by this technique.
4) REDUNDANCY: Redundancy is twofold, as it can sup-
port both detection and mitigation. It is important to highlight
that purely redundant systems suffer from the same design
faults and vulnerabilities. Thus, diversity is combined with
redundancy to overcome this issue.
– HW/SW Redundancy [11]–[13], [15], [17]–[20]. Redun-
dancy combined with a voter allows to mask system failures.
The voter compares the results of a number of independently
executed software and/or hardware modules and selects, for
instance, the majority [30]. Repeating the computation n times
on the same hardware can be used to detect random faults.
– Sensor/Data Fusion [13]. Data from different origins may be
fused to compensate inaccuracies or temporary sensor failures.
Sensor fusion, e. g., extended Kalman filter [60] and particle
filter [31], can be used to describe the non-linear relationship
between sensors. For example, the motion of a vehicle can
be described with measurements from the wheel speed sensor,
GPS location and data received from other vehicles.
– Agreement/Voting [11], [13], [17], [20]. Redundant compo-
nents are required for this technique. Voting can be realized in
two ways, i. e., exact voting and inexact voting, where the latter
allows a variation of the result within a certain range [30].
– N-version Design [11]–[13], [17], [19]. N versions of a
software with the same requirements are developed by N
independent teams resulting in a diverse set of functionally
equivalent software components that fulfill the same specifi-
cation. These versions are executed concurrently and a voter
decides based on the majority or calculates, for instance, the
median or average of the results [32].
– Recovery Blocks [11], [19], [20]. Similar to n-version
design, n versions of a software component exist; however,
only one version is executed at a time. After the active version
is executed, a common acceptance test decides whether the
result is accepted. In case the result is rejected, the subsequent
version is executed and evaluated [32], [33].
– N self-checking [17]. This technique is a combination of
n-version design and recovery blocks. It requires at least
two diverse versions with their own acceptance test. When
the active component fails its acceptance test, the subsequent
component takes over [33].
– N-variant Systems. Multi-variant execution automatically
diversifies software and monitors the output of at least two
variants to detect and mitigate attacks [34].
– Replacement of Cold/Hot Spares [13]. Concurrent and se-
quential execution of redundant software components is costly
in terms of energy consumption and computational resources.
Therefore, the introduction of cold or hot spares, such as in N
self-checking, have been found to be a viable alternative [13].
B. Mitigation
After detecting an attack or anomaly, the system needs to
react to reduce the impact of the attack. Some mitigation
techniques may require the transition to a non-optimal state.
1) ADAPTIVE RESPONSE: We focus on techniques that
adapt the response of a function or sub-system in order to
maintain its intended functionality.
– Retry [18], [19]. Performing the same computation with new
measurements if the first computation resulted in an undesired
system state or in an error. Retry can mitigate a replay attack.
– Model-based Response and State Estimation [15], [21]. Sys-
tem models, e. g., Kalman filter for state estimation [60], [61],
or parameter estimation techniques, like regression analysis,
are not only a temporary solution to mitigate attacks, such as
replay and masquerading attacks, they can also be used to alert
the system and log important information for forensics [44].
2) RUNTIME ENFORCEMENT: Runtime enforcement is
an extension of runtime verification where the system also
reacts to violations [22].
3) RECONFIGURATION AND REPARAMETERIZATION:
The system protects itself by adapting parameters when an
attack is detected. We distinguish between reconfiguration and
migration in the way that migration focuses on relocating
functionality whereas reconfiguration changes system or ap-
plication parameters.
– Reinitialization [11]. Temporary faults and attacks can be
addressed with this technique. However, permanent faults or
reoccurring attacks cannot be mitigated by restoring the system
or a function to its initial state. Reinitialization can be seen as
checkpoint recovery with the checkpoint being the initial state
of the system or function.
– Reparameterization [13]. Is similar to reinitialization, how-
ever, the system configuration is dynamically adjusted to the
situation. As Ratasich et al. [13] point out, reparameterization
typically results in a non-optimal state.
– Graceful Degradation / Limp Mode [13], [15]. Given the ex-
tended automated driving functions of future vehicles, it is of
utmost importance to implement more sophisticated solutions
that ensure the passengers safety when key components in the
vehicle fail or are subject to attacks. These techniques are
similar to reparameterization, but focus on safety and should
be seen as a last resort. Modern vehicles already have a so-
called limp mode implemented, which is triggered when the
vehicle detects major technical problems [62].
– Isolation [11], [13]. Restricting access or completely isolat-
ing system components in the presence of an error or intrusion
can limit the impact on the entire system and its performance.
– Restructure [11]. Restructuring components within a sub-
system aims at providing resilience through reconfiguration
of affected components. Segovia et al. [15] explore software
reflection as means to mitigate attacks.
– Dynamic Deployment of Policies [15]. Security or other
policies can be applied dynamically based on the type of
attack, e. g., DoS or masquerading, that is detected.
– Rescue Workflow [18], [19]. A workflow can be used to
describe tasks with their dependencies to each other. The idea
behind rescue workflows is to dynamically adjust the structure
of the workflow when an error or intrusion affects a specific
task. Existing cloud solutions may need to be adapted for
automotive systems.
C. Recovery
Recovery techniques intend to bring the system back to an
optimal state.
1) MIGRATION: These techniques are mainly originating
from high performance computing and cloud systems. As
future automotive systems move towards a centralized archi-
tecture, virtualization and service-oriented architectures are
becoming more relevant.
– Relocation/Migration [13], [19]. Virtualization such as hy-
pervisor and container-based solutions allow a fast migration
and relocalization to other nodes in the vehicular network.
– Preemptive Migration [18], [19]. Continuous monitoring
and analysis of the system can be used to relocate software
functions or services before a fault occurs.
2) CHECKPOINTING & ROLLBACK: A checkpoint or
snapshot describes the system state at a specific point in time.
By design, recovery does not prevent the same attacks from
happening again.
– Re-instantiation/Restart [11], [13], [17], [19]. When an
intrusion is detected, the affected component can be re-
instantiated or restarted to recover to a known, error and attack
free, state. This technique can be combined with reparameter-
ization to avoid the same anomaly to happen again [13].
– Checkpoint Recovery [11], [17]–[20]. Snapshots can be cre-
ated in two ways: checkpoint-based and log-based. Egwutuoha
et al. [17] highlight the complexity of taking checkpoints in a
distributed system, as these checkpoints need to be consistent.
– Software Rejuvenation [11], [19]. This technique carries out
periodic restarts or reinitializations of the system to maintain
a known, error-free state.
3) ROLLFORWARD ACTIONS: These techniques aim at
bringing the system to a stable state immediately before the
error or attack was detected. As in rollback, the recovery is
based on using checkpoint-based or log-based recovery [11].
– Exception Handling [11]. From a model-driven engineering
view, Rollforward can be performed using exception handling.
Slåtten et al. [20] highlight that this solution can be only
applied to anticipated events.
D. Endurance
Resilience needs to be ensured over the entire lifetime of
a vehicle. The preceding techniques center around providing
immediate response when anomalies are detected.
1) SELF-*: Self-* or self-X techniques cover solutions and
research directions focusing on how to introduce autonomy
into the system. This pattern is especially important for future
vehicles as the environment is and will change frequently,
new vulnerabilities will be found, new attempts to attack
vehicles and their infrastructure will be developed, and new
technologies will appear. Also, considering the lifetime of cars,
which is around 10–15 years, it is evident that automotive
systems need to adapt to a certain extent autonomously.
2) VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION: Due to the increas-
ing functionality and interconnectedness of modern vehicles it
is required to update software components via over-the-air up-
dates in order to fix vulnerabilities and bugs or upgrade vehicle
functions. This is especially challenging as each vehicle model
can be further configured, resulting in a manifold of possible
vehicle configurations.
3) ROBUSTNESS: Artificial intelligence, especially ma-
chine learning, is a key technology for autonomous driving
and decision making, as the system needs to be able to handle
previously unseen situations [13].
4) FORENSICS: Providing evidence of intrusions even af-
ter a crash is important for taking appropriate countermeasures.
– Secure Logging. Hoppe et al. [52] express the need for
forensic solutions in vehicles. Non-safety-critical events, such
as updates, component failures and other malfunctions, need to
be logged and stored securely for a prospective analysis. The
authors also discuss in great detail which information and how
this information can be stored in vehicles.
– Attack Analysis. Nilsson and Larson [55] specify require-
ments for forensic analyses of the in-vehicle network. It is also
important to analyze attacks disclosed by researchers, such as
Checkoway et al. [63] and Miller and Valasek [64], as well as
attacks logged by the vehicle manufacturers in order to take
appropriate actions.
V. RELATED WORK
Making vehicles safe and secure has traditionally been the
main focus in research. For instance, methods to combine
safety and security [65] and how to assess an automotive
system and/or derive security requirements and mechanisms
have been proposed [66]–[68]. Le et al. [69] provide a survey
on security and privacy in automotive systems and further
provide an overview of suitable security mechanisms.
One of the first structured collections of principles for cyber
resilience is the Cyber Resiliency Engineering Framework [70]
by MITRE in 2011 which got further incorporated in NIST
SP 800-160v2 [12]. Other work describing principles for
resilience have been either concentrating on other domains,
i. e., high performance computing, cyber-physical systems,
or networks, or they focused particularly on dependability
or fault tolerance. Table I provides an overview of relevant
publications, which provide a comprehensive overview or
collection of techniques, and categorizes them according to
their discipline and the area they are focusing on.
The reviewed publications classify the identified techniques
in different ways. Hukerikar et al. [11] divide them into
strategies, i. e., fault treatment, recovery, and compensation,
whereas Ratasich et al. [13] organize them according to their
ability, i. e., detection and diagnosis, recovery or mitigation,
and long-term dependability and security. Work focusing on
fault tolerance either split the identified techniques in reactive
and proactive measures [18], [19] or classify them according
to their ability, e. g., error handling and recovery [17], [20].
With the developed REMIND framework, we contribute
to supporting the resilience of automotive systems by: (i)
identifying techniques for attack detection, mitigation, recov-
ery, and resilience endurance; (ii) organizing the techniques
into a taxonomy to guide designers when selecting resilience
techniques; (iii) providing guidelines on how the REMIND
framework can be used against common security threats and
attacks; and (iv) discussing the trade-offs when applying the
techniques that are highlighted in this framework.
In addition to the identified techniques in Figure 1, we point
to implementations relevant for or specific to the automotive
domain in Appendix B.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reviewed work shows the current research efforts
towards making systems resilient to attacks and faults in
related domains. We present a novel structure for categorizing
resilience techniques in the form of the REMIND framework
with the aim to lead designers in making informed decisions
when choosing resilience techniques. We build upon the ex-
isting work and set the focus on the limitations of automotive
systems and their challenges. The REMIND techniques have
been chosen considering automotive assets and related attacks
which are described in Section III and further linked to the
guidelines and trade-off analysis in Appendix A.
Future work includes the validation of the REMIND frame-
work in regard to studying its applicability in industry in
more depth. Furthermore, specific solutions for the identified
techniques that consider the unique properties of automotive
vehicles can be explored. Especially, the role of software-
defined networking and its contribution to resilience can be
investigated.
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[35] Andrea Höller, Tobias Rauter, Johannes Iber, and Christian Kreiner.
Towards dynamic software diversity for resilient redundant embedded
systems. In Alessandro Fantechi and Patrizio Pelliccione, editors,
Software Engineering for Resilient Systems, pages 16–30, Cham, 2015.
Springer International Publishing.
[36] Tsvika Dagan, Yuval Montvelisky, Mirco Marchetti, Dario Stabili,
Michele Colajanni, and Avishai Wool. Vehicle safe-mode, concept to
practice limp-mode in the service of cybersecurity. SAE Int. J. Transp.
Cyber. & Privacy 2 (2), feb 2020.
[37] Tasuku Ishigooka, Satoshi Otsuka, Kazuyoshi Serizawa, Ryo Tsuchiya,
and Fumio Narisawa. Graceful degradation design process for au-
tonomous driving system. In Alexander Romanovsky, Elena Troubit-
syna, and Friedemann Bitsch, editors, Computer Safety, Reliability, and
Security, pages 19–34, Cham, 2019. Springer International Publishing.
[38] Andreas Reschka, Gerrit Bagschik, Simon Ulbrich, Marcus Nolte, and
Markus Maurer. Ability and skill graphs for system modeling, online
monitoring, and decision support for vehicle guidance systems. In 2015
IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV), pages 933–939, 2015.
[39] Jose Rubio-Hernan, Rishikesh Sahay, Luca De Cicco, and Joaquin
Garcia-Alfaro. Cyber-physical architecture assisted by programmable
networking. Internet Technology Letters, 1(4):e44, 2018.
[40] Zhe Jiang, Neil C. Audsley, and Pan Dong. BlueVisor: A Scalable
Real-Time Hardware Hypervisor for Many-Core Embedded Systems.
In 2018 IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications
Symposium (RTAS), pages 75–84, 2018.
[41] Pekka Alho and Jouni Mattila. Service-oriented approach to fault
tolerance in cpss. Journal of Systems and Software, 105:1 – 17, 2015.
[42] Meng Wu, Haibo Zeng, Chao Wang, and Huafeng Yu. INVITED: Safety
guard: Runtime enforcement for safety-critical cyber-physical systems.
In 2017 54th ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC),
pages 1–6, 2017.
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APPENDIX A
REMIND RESILIENCE GUIDELINES
In this section, we report in Table III resilience techniques that can be used against common security threats and attacks.
We also describe the trade-offs when implementing these techniques.









Detection • Statistical Techniques [13]
• Machine Learning/Data
Mining [13]
• Localization (e. g., [28])
• Sensor/Data Fusion [13]
• Less computation is required.
• No domain knowledge is needed. It handles
multivariate and non-linear data.
• Identifies the exclusive part causing the fault
or attack.
• Calculates a value of trust of the data sources
derived from the normalization factor.
• Very sensitive to outliers, imprecise detection,
and increased complexity when modelling non-
linear data.
• Requires training. Imprecise prediction: false
positives and false negatives. Time penalty and
resource consumption (power, processing, and
storage).
• Often applied offline. The precision of the
localization is dependent on both, the number
of observed parameters and the set frequency
for probing monitored resources.
• Imprecise detection: false positives and neg-
atives. It also introduces time penalty (increase
in execution time) and space penalty (increase
in resource usage).
Mitigation • Hardware Redundancy [11]–[13],
[15], [17]–[20]
• Enables offsetting the effects of faults and
attacks, and allows the progress of the system
without loss of functionality.
• Time penalty (increase in execution time)
and resource consumption (increase in re-
quired resources). Hardware costs independent
of whether attacks occur. Also, the design and
verification of replicas requires an effort.
Recovery • Relocation/Migration [13], [19] • Maintain system functionality in an opera-
tional state as it was before the fault or attack.
• May cause a degraded system, with less
functionality, resources, and performance.
Endurance • Self-aware Fault Tolerance [46] • Enables systems to adapt their behavior when
a fault or attack occurs in their environment,
thus allowing a continuous operation of these
systems.
• Complexity and resource consumption.
Asset Attack
Software Malware/Manipulated Software
Detection • Signature-based Detection [13]
• Runtime Verification [13], [20]
• A precisely calibrated signature effectively
identifies abnormal events during software exe-
cution.
• Well-established and efficient technique to
verify the correctness of software execution and
monitor the behavior of the system.
• Does not work when designers and 3rd party
suppliers (e.g., intellectual property providers)
are not trusted. It cannot handle zero-day at-
tacks and, thus, often used in combination with
anomaly-based techniques leading to an in-
creased resource consumption and time penalty.
• Limited coverage. The used monitoring algo-
rithms usually handle a single execution trace
which limits the scope of the verification.
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Mitigation • Software Redundancy [11]–[13],
[15], [17]–[20]
• N-Version Design [11]–[13],
[17], [19]
• Agreement/Voting [11], [13],
[17], [20]
• Recovery Blocks [11], [19], [20]
• N self-checking [17]
• Helps to contain and exclude malicious be-
havior (i.e., reduces likelihood of harm). Enable
restoration in case of disruption. Enhances the
availability of critical capabilities.
• Helps to mitigate the impact of failures when
a risk is introduced to system design or config-
uration.
• Typically combined with redundancy. Can
be used to select, for instance, the average or
median of the results provided by the redundant
sources.
• Uses different implementations of the same
design specification to provide tolerance of de-
sign faults.
• Provides mitigation by creating N versions of
the same software, each with its own acceptance
test. The version that passes its own acceptance
test is selected through an acceptance voting
system.
• Resource consumption. It demands the pro-
tection of redundant resources. It can degrade
over time as configurations are updated or
connectivity changes. It is often applied with
diversity techniques which increases complexity
and leads to scalability issues.
• Requires much effort for designing, imple-
mentation, testing, and validation of the N in-
dependent versions.
• Attackers may exploit the voting process in
order to force the system to a degraded mode.
• Requires extra verification and validation ef-
fort and, thus, more resource consumption. It
might be difficult to create alternative soft-
ware implementations without any correlation
between the various versions.
• Causes an increase in required resources and
execution time.
Recovery • Preemptive Migration [18], [19]
• Checkpoint Recovery [11], [17]–
[20]
• Software Rejuvenation [11], [19]
• Prevents failures from impacting running par-
allel applications by enabling the migration of
running software from one virtual machine to
another in real time.
• Helps the system to resume its operation in
a state free of the effects of the fault or attack.
Frequent checkpointing reduces the amount of
lost work.
• Helps avoiding the costs of failures from soft-
ware degradation, as periodic (graceful) restarts
of the software component allow the release and
re-allocation of memory, thus, operation in a
clean state.
• Lack of standardized metrics for measuring
and evaluating the health and interfaces between
system components.
• Overhead in relation to the size and frequency
of created checkpoints. Creating a checkpoint,
for instance, requires interrupting the normal
operation of a system to record the checkpoint.
Moreover, it requires storage resources to store
the checkpoint. The created checkpoints might
potentially contain an error or intrusion that
has not been detected yet. Globally consistent
checkpoints are not trivial to obtain in a dis-
tributed system, due to e. g., variation of the
local clock, parallel computation and possible
different system states.
• Requires shutting the software down and
restarting it periodically which causes the soft-
ware to be unavailable for the duration of the
restart. It is often a slow process requiring an
extra overhead.
Endurance • Platform-centric Self-aware-
ness [45]
• Secure Logging (e. g., [52]–
[54])
• Enables systems to recognize their own state
and to continuously adapt to change, evolution,
system interference, environment dynamics, and
uncertainty. It optimizes resilience, quality of
service, and supports system dynamics and
openness. It also helps to reduce uncertainties
and identify inconsistencies.
• Prevents modifying the logs by using e.g.,
chained hashes. It enables storing security-
related events containing information about
e.g., flash operations, external interactions, and
power downtime. This information helps to re-
construct events, detect intrusions and identify
problems.
• Automatically maintaining coherent specifi-
cations that capture and monitor security is a
challenging task. Complexity, scalability, and
difficulty in dealing with uncertainties and inac-
curacies. The determination of relevant depen-
dencies in a complex system is also challenging.
• Resource consumption and time penalty.
Moreover, missing authentication and lack of
cryptographic means to ensure data integrity can
limit the potential of the logging.
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Detection • Specification-based Anomaly
Detection (e. g., [24])
• Localization (e. g., [28])
• Verification of Safety-Proper-
ties [13]
• Helps detecting anomalies in the system’s
behavior by reporting the specific deviation that
has been observed.
• Identifies the exclusive part causing the fault
or attack.
• Ensures that the system does not evolve in un-
safe state starting from some initial conditions.
• Needs of resources for detection and process-
ing of collected information (e.g., costly intel-
ligent sensors). Domain knowledge is required
to specify normal behavior. Specifications need
to be adapted for each specific vehicle configu-
ration otherwise risk of high false positives or
negatives.
• Requires additional resources.
• It is limited to small scale systems.
Mitigation • Isolation [11], [13]
• Restructure [11]
• It provides a remedy to enable the system to
continue its operation by offsetting the effect of
the attack. Also, it prevents loss of functionality.
• Helps to mitigate incorrectness in the interac-
tions between the components or subsystems by
excluding the affected part from interacting with
the rest of the system, and maintaining system
functionality.
• Introduces a time penalty and an increase in
required resources (e.g., replica modules that are
used to compensate for isolating the affected
component of the system).
• May cause an operation of the system in a
degraded condition which influences its perfor-
mance and incurs additional time overhead to
the system.
Recovery • Relocation/Migration [13], [19]
• Re-instantiation/Restart [11],
[13], [17], [19]
• Maintain system functionality in an opera-
tional state as it was before the fault or attack.
• Helps to restore the system to its initial
state when the impact of the attack can not be
handled in another manner. It guarantees that
the impact of the attack is completely removed.
• May cause a degradation in the operation of
the system which influences the performance
and functionality thereof.
• Restoring the system to its initial state causes
lost data, such as privacy related data (e. g.,
location, speed, driving behavior) and work-
shop data (e. g., vehicle health, engine data and
emissions). The impact of the lost data depends
on the type of data and the current need for
it. In addition, the re-instantiation of safety-
critical functions may require the vehicle to be
in standstill.
Endurance • Self-adaptation [47], [48] • Ensures a secure, reliable, and predictable
communication between system components
and between the system and its environment.
Supports and maintains an acceptable level of
service despite the occurrence of faults and
other factors that affect normal operations.
Seamlessly adapts to different network loads
and reacts to security threats and other distur-
bances in the environment.







• Helps to detect anomalies by analyzing avail-
able audit logs and records (e.g., entropy mea-
sures) and comparing these records with defined
normal behaviors. More records enhance the
precision of the detection.
• Provides an indication (i.e., a robustness de-
gree) to what extent temporal logic properties
are from satisfying or violating a specification.
• Time penalty for processing audit records.
More records at disposal increases the process-
ing time and complexity. On the other hand, a
low number of records leads to an imprecise
detection with more false positives and false
negatives.
• Imprecise detection: false positives and false
negatives
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Mitigation • Rescue Workflow [18], [19]
(adaptation may be necessary)
• Dynamic Deployment of
Policies [15]
• Enables the system to continue operation after
the failure of the task until it is unable to
proceed without amending the fault or attack.
Already finished tasks do not need re-execution,
thus saving time and resources.
• Takes the dynamic and changing nature of
attacks into account. Deploys different defense
policies depending on the attack, for example, it
can modify the executed actions while the attack
is going on.
• It may lead to a decrease in the quality of
service. Time penalty might be caused by re-
computing and migrating the tasks which cause
the problem.
• Leads to performance overhead. Moreover,
it always requires runtime permissions which
may not be present when running normally.
Complexity.




• Helps the system to resume its operation in
a state free of the effects of the fault or attack.
Frequent checkpointing reduces the amount of
lost work.
• Helps to restore the system to its initial
state when the impact of the attack can not be
handled in another manner. It guarantees that
the impact of the attack is completely removed.
• Overhead in relation to the size and frequency
of created checkpoints. Creating a checkpoint,
for instance, requires interrupting the normal
operation of a system to record the checkpoint.
Moreover, it requires storage resources to store
the checkpoint. The created checkpoints might
potentially contain an error or intrusion that
has not been detected yet. Globally consistent
checkpoints are not trivial to obtain in a dis-
tributed system, due to e. g., variation of the
local clock, parallel computation and possible
different system states.
• Restoring the system to its initial state causes
lost data, such as privacy related data (e. g.,
location, speed, driving behavior) and work-
shop data (e. g., vehicle health, engine data and
emissions). The impact of the lost data depends
on the type of data and the current need for
it. In addition, the re-instantiation of safety-
critical functions may require the vehicle to be
in standstill.
Endurance • Secure Logging (e. g., [52]–[54]) • Prevents modifying the logs by using e.g.,
chained hashes. It enables storing security-
related events containing information about
e.g., flash operations, external interactions, and
power downtime. This information helps to re-
construct events, detect intrusions and identify
problems.
• Resource consumption and time penalty.
Moreover, it requires authentication and cryp-




Detection • Signature-based Detection [13]
• Verification of Safety-Proper-
ties [13]
• A precisely calibrated signature effectively
identifies abnormal events during software exe-
cution.
• Ensures that the system does not evolve in un-
safe state starting from some initial conditions.
• Does not work when designers and intellectual
property providers are not trusted. It cannot
handle zero-day attacks and, thus, often used
with Anomaly-based techniques leading to a in-
creased resource consumption and time penalty.
• It is limited to small scale systems.
Mitigation • Reparameterization [13]
• Isolation [11], [13]
• Graceful Degradation [13], [15]
• Enables adaptation by switching the configu-
ration parameters of the compromised compo-
nent to another configuration.
• It provides a remedy to enable the system to
continue its operation by offsetting the effect of
the attack. Also, it prevents loss of functionality.
• Prevents a catastrophic failure of the system.
It enables a system to continue functioning even
after parts of the system have been compro-
mised. It shuts down less critical functions to
allocate the resources to more critical functions
to maintain availability.
• Decreases the quality of service.
• Introduces a time penalty and an increase in
required resources (e.g., replica modules that are
used to compensate for isolating the affected
component of the system).
• Causes a degradation in the performance of
the operations and services of the system.
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Recovery • Relocation/Migration [13], [19]
• Software Rejuvenation [11],
[19]
• Reinitialization [11]
• Maintain system functionality in an opera-
tional state as it was before the fault or attack.
• Helps avoiding the costs of failures from soft-
ware degradation, as periodic (graceful) restarts
of the software component allow the release and
re-allocation of memory, thus, operation in a
clean state.
• Applied in conditions in which the mitigation
is deemed impossible. Restores or pristine resets
the system to its initial state.
• May cause an operation of the system in a
degraded condition which influences its perfor-
mance.
• Requires shutting the software down and
restarting it periodically which causes the soft-
ware to be unavailable for the duration of the
restart. It is often a slow process requiring an
extra overhead.
• Causes loss of work, and accordingly leads to
a waste of resources.
Endurance • Attack Analysis / Reconstruction
(e. g., [55], [56])
• Helps to enhance resilience by systematically
and empirically analyzing attacks as well as
used technologies (potential entry point, e.g.,
Bluetooth and WiFi) that interact with the ex-
ternal environment.
• Resource consumption and analysis effort.
Asset Attack
Data Storage Unauthorized Read/Manipulation
Detection • Signature-based Detection [13]
• Specification-based Anomaly
Detection (e. g., [24])
• A precisely calibrated signature effectively
identifies abnormal events during software exe-
cution.
• Helps detecting anomalies in the system’s
behavior by reporting the specific deviation that
has been observed.
• Does not work when designers and intellectual
property providers are not trusted. It cannot
handle zero-day attacks and, thus, often used
with Anomaly-based techniques leading to a in-
creased resource consumption and time penalty.
• Needs of resources for detection and process-
ing of collected information (e.g., costly intel-
ligent sensors). Domain knowledge is required
to specify normal behavior. Specifications need
to be adapted for each specific vehicle configu-
ration otherwise risk of high false positives or
negatives.
Mitigation • Redundancy [11]–[13], [15],
[17]–[20]
• Isolation [11], [13]
• It enables data backup and restore by repli-
cating information and data sources.
• It provides a remedy to enable the system to
continue its operation by offsetting the effect of
the attack. Also, it prevents loss of functionality.
• Requires extra resources for data storage.
• Introduces a time penalty and an increase in
required resources (e.g., replica modules that are
used to compensate for isolating the affected
component of the system).
Recovery • Dynamic Deployment of Poli-
cies [15]
• Takes the dynamic and changing nature of
attacks into account. Deploys different defense
policies depending on the attack, for example, it
can modify the executed actions while the attack
is going on.
• Leads to performance overhead. Requires
runtime permissions which may not be present
when running normally. Complexity.
Endurance • Secure Logging (e. g., [52])
• Attack Analysis / Reconstruction
(e. g., [55], [56])
• Prevents modifying the logs by using e.g.,
chained hashes. It enables storing security-
related events containing information about
e.g., flash operations, external interactions, and
power downtime. This information helps to re-
construct events, detect intrusions and identify
problems.
• Helps to enhance resilience by systematically
and empirically analyzing attacks as well as
used technologies (potential entry point, e.g.,
Bluetooth and WiFi) that interact with the ex-
ternal environment.
• Resource consumption and time penalty.
Moreover, missing authentication and lack of
cryptographic means to ensure data integrity can
limit the potential of the logging.
• resource consumption and analysis effort.
APPENDIX B
PROPOSED AUTOMOTIVE SOLUTIONS
In Table IV we provide a description of the solutions referred to in Figure 1. This overview of specific solutions should be
considered as a starting point for interested readers and is by no means complete.





Runtime Verification Heffernan et al. [23] use the automotive functional safety standard ISO 26262 as a
guide to derive logical formulae. They demonstrate the feasibility of their proposed
runtime verification monitor with an automotive gearbox control system as use case.
Specification-based
Anomaly Detection
Müter et al. [24] describe eight detection sensors that are applicable for the internal
network of automotive systems. Six of these sensors are specification-based, e. g., the
frequency of specific message types and the range of transmitted values like speed.
Anomaly-
Based
Statistical Techniques Nowdehi et al. [25] propose an IDS that learns about the automotive system by
learning from samples of normal traffic without requiring a model definition.
Machine Learning Hanselmann et al. [26] propose CANet an unsupervised IDS for the automotive CAN
bus. The anomaly score is calculated using the error between the reconstructed signal
and the true signal value.
Information-theoretic Müter et al. [27] design an entropy-based IDSs for automotive systems with experi-
mental results using data from a vehicle’s CAN-Body network.
Localization Cho and Shin [28] present a scheme identifying the attacking ECU based on
fingerprinting the voltage measurements on the CAN bus for each ECU. We see great
opportunities in the localization of attacks when considering a centralized vehicle
architecture combined with virtualisation techniques. This allows us to get detailed




Attack Prediction Husák et al [29] perform a survey about current attack projection and prediction
techniques in cybersecurity.




Höller et al. [35] introduce an adaptive dynamic software diversity method. The
diversification control receives error information from the decision mechanism and
randomizes specific parameters during execution. Their experimental use cases demon-





Model-based Response Cómbita et al. provide a survey on response and reconfiguration techniques for cyber-
physical control systems. Controllers or other systems that can be modelled as a
control loop can be, for instance, adjusted to have another module in the feedback loop
that compares the actual feedback from the control loop with a simulated/modelled
response of what is expected.
Runtime
Enforcement






Graceful Degradation Dagan et al. [36] provide an architectural design on how to extend limp modes so
that they can be additionally used in a cyber security context. A safe-mode manager
sends out triggering messages that cause the ECUs to transition to a limp mode when
cyber-breaches are detected.
Ishigooka et al. [37] propose a graceful degradation design process for autonomous
vehicles with focus on safety.
Reschkka et al. [38] explore how skills and ability graphs can be used for modelling,
on-line monitoring and supporting decision making of driving functions.
TABLE IV – Continued on next page
TABLE IV – Continued from previous page
Pattern Technique Solution
Restructure Segovia et al. [15] set the focus of their survey on software reflection as mitigation
technique for SCADA systems. Software reflection enables the system itself to
examine and change its execution behaviour at runtime, which allows, for instance,
the system to take actions when an attack is detected. The drawbacks currently seen
in software reflection are the performance overhead, the increased execution time and
the extended permissions required by software reflection.
Dynamic Deployment
of Policies
Rubio-Hernan et al. [39] propose an architecture for CPS that combines feedback
control loops with programmable networking in order to mitigate attacks by re-routing
traffic or applying security rules.
RECOVERY
Migration Relocation/Migration Jiang et al. [40] propose a hypervisor that meets real-time requirements.
Other relocation techniques are microservices [72]. Pekka and Mattila [41] propose a
service-oriented architecture for real-time CPSs.
Pre-emptive Migration Engelmann et al. [73] describe a pre-emptive migration technique which uses a
feedback-loop for observing health parameters to detect behaviour indicating a fault.
This solution was developed for high performance computing and its applicability for
the automotive domain needs to be further investigated.
Checkpointing
and Rollback
Software Rejuvenation Romangnoli et al. [74] describe a method to decide when it is safe to reload the
software of a CPS.
ENDURANCE
Self-* Continuous Change Möstl et al. [45] identify in their work the challenges of continuous change and
evolution of CPS and propose two frameworks for self-aware systems centring around
self-modelling, self-configuration and self-monitoring. The controlling concurrent
change (CCC) framework is concerned with how to deal with changes in software
components during the lifetime of a CPS. The authors highlight that the well-
established V-model currently used is not designed for continuous change and
therefore parts of the integration testing and system validation and verification need
to be moved to the system itself. The proposed framework includes an automated
integration process for new or updated functions that addresses safety, security,
availability and real-time requirements. The structure and workflow of the proposed
framework is further described using an automotive use case. The second framework
concentrates on optimising performance, power consumption and resilience of CPS
by using self-organisation and self-awareness techniques.
Verificaton &
Validation
Challenges in V&V De Lemos [51] discuss research challenges of verification and validation for self-
adaptive systems at runtime.
Robustness Adversarial Attacks on
DNN
Yuan et al. [57] give an overview of current adversarial attack and defence techniques
for deep learning.
Forensics Secure Logging Lee et al. [53] describe T-Box a secure logging solution for automotive systems that
makes use of the trusted execution environment in ARM TrustZone.
Mansor et al. [54] propose a framework to log vehicle data, such as diagnostic
transmission codes, via the mobile phone and store it on a secure cloud storage.
Attack Analysis / Re-
construction
Nilsson and Larson [55] discuss the requirements for conducting forensic investiga-
tions on the in-vehicle network.
Bortles et al. [56] present which types of data may be retained from current
infotainment and telematic systems.
